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ABSTRACT
IP Anycast is used for services such as DNS and Content
Delivery Networks to provide the capacity to handle Dis-
tributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) aacks. During a DDoS
aack service operators may wish to redistribute trac be-
tween anycast sites to take advantage of sites with unused
or greater capacity. Depending on site trac and aack size,
operators may instead choose to concentrate aackers in a
few sites to preserve operation in others. Previously service
operators have taken these actions during aacks, but how to
do so has not been described publicly. is paper meets that
need, describing methods to use BGP to shi trac when
under DDoS that can build a “response playbook”. Operators
can use this playbook, with our new method to estimate at-
tack size, to respond to aacks. We also explore constraints
on responses seen in an anycast deployment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Anycast routing is used by services like DNS or CDN where
multiple sites announce the same prex from geographically
distributed locations. Dened in 1993 [43] anycast was rst
deployed by DNS roots in the early-2000s [4, 26, 56], and to-
day it is widely used by DNS providers and Content Delivery
Networks [15, 16, 21, 23, 65].
In IP anycast, BGP routes each network to a particular
anycast site, dividing the world into catchments. BGP usu-
ally assigns user’s networks to nearby anycast sites, provid-
ing generally good latency [54]. Anycast also helps during
Distributed-Denial-of-Services (DDoS) aacks, since many
sites provide a greater aggregate capacity than a single very
large site. Each anycast catchment is independent, so if at-
tackers overwhelm one site, others may still operate within
capacity.
DDoS aacks are geing larger and more common. Dif-
ferent root servers and anycast services frequently report
DDoS events [17, 36, 41, 42]. Dierent automated tools
make it easier to make aacks [66], and by using DDoS-
as-a-Service, unsophisticated users can now make aacks
for only US$10 [33, 58]. DDoS intensity is still growing as
we observe the recent memcached aack exceeds 1.35 Tb/s
in size [40], and Internet-of-ings devices provide millions
of vulnerable devices for botnets [30].
Operators depend on anycast during DDoS aacks, to
provide capacity to handle the aack and to isolate aackers
in catchments. Service operators would like to adapt to an
ongoing aack, perhaps shiing load from overloaded sites
to other sites with excess capacity. Prior studies of DDoS
events have shown that operators take these actions but
suggested that the best action to take depends on aack size
and location compared to anycast site capacity [38]. While
prior work suggested countermeasures and we know that
operators use routing during aacks, there has been only
limited evaluation of how routing choices change trac [5,
24, 31, 46], and no specic, public guidance on how to use
routing during an aack.
e goal of this paper to provide guidance to mitigate a
DDoS aack using BGP routing to balance trac across an
anycast service.
Our rst contribution is to dene the mechanisms we
need to balance trac during DDoS. Defense requires two
steps: rst, one must estimate trac to each site when it
is under aack (§3.3). Sites may have dierent capacities
and receive aacks at dierent intensity—the defender must
have a rough estimate of these factors to make an informed
response. Second, one must employ BGP policy routing mech-
anisms to shi trac (§3.5). While general mechanisms for
BGP policy are well known, their availability and details
vary across Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and ISPs. We
document what approaches are typical and how they apply
to DDoS defense.
e second contribution of our work is to show how eec-
tive these tools are in practice (§6). While the concept of spe-
cic BGP mechanisms is clear (for example, AS-prepending
discourages trac), understanding how much trac shis is
a complex function. We evaluate how the AS policy, network
topology, and the anycast deployment can aect the trac
shi (§7). We show that the granularity of control can be
surprisingly limited, where sometimes large changes show-
ing lile or no eects, while some small changes can shi
nearly all trac to or from a site. ese eects are strongly
inuenced by anycast deployment and ASes with whom they
peer at each site. While we cannot show all possible deploy-
ments, we systematically explore dierent congurations to
show typical ranges of response.
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Our nal contribution is to demonstrate that these ap-
proaches can defend against aacks successfully. We replay
real-world aacks in a testbed and manipulate routing to
defend (§8).
Our work uses publicly available datasets. Data from our
experiments is available at no charge. We provide data from
the experiments on the testbeds and aack trac evaluated.
Because our data concerns services and not individuals, we
see no privacy concerns.
2 RELATEDWORK
Anycast routing has been studied for a long time from the
perspective of routing, performance, and DDoS-prevention.
BGP to steer trac: Prior works showed BGP is eec-
tive to steer trac to control link load [8, 24, 47]. But we
need to consider anycast topology and upstream providers
to make path prepending more eective [5]. Others pro-
posed to manipulate BGP based on packet loss, latency and
jier [39, 46].
Chand et al. [13] suggested the concomitant use with BGP
Communities [10, 12, 61] to manipulate trac. More recently
BGP communities have been used to create blackholes in
IXPs and ISPs [19, 25].
Anycast performance: Most anycast research focused
in ecient delivery and stability [11, 34, 35, 51, 64]. Later
studies explicitly investigate the proximity of the clients [5,
11, 34]. Some studies try to improve anycast through topol-
ogy changes [37, 54]. Anycasted services for DDoS is already
used in commercial solutions e.g., Amazon [55], Akamai[62]
and AT&T [59]. However, none of them address how to
use routing manipulations as a DDoS defense mechanism or
make it clear.
Anycast catchment control as aDDoSmitigation tool:
e idea of handling DDoS aacks by absorbing or shiing
load across anycast sites has been long used by operators, but
to our knowledge it was only formalized in 2016 by Moura et
al. [38]. Kuipers et al. [31] extended rened Moura’s work,
dening the trac shiing approaches that we review in
§3.4 and explore through experiment.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to
combine a full DDoS defense strategy. Our work goes from
a new technique to estimate aack load to evaluate the prob-
able routing decision, and their collateral eects over other
sites. We prove our ndings in a real aack and measure our
results in two dierent anycast testbeds.
3 MECHANISMS TO DEFEND AGAINST
DDOS
In this section, we describe an intervention against DDoS by
estimating trac sent to each site, and using BGP tools and
defense strategies.
3.1 Overview and Decision Support
DDoS defense must include planning and response. Before
the aack, the operator should map their anycast system
(§3.2). en during the aack, the operator detects the aack,
they (a) deploy any lters they have, if they can, then (b)
assesses the trac sent to each site under aack (§3.3), (c)
selects a strategy to shi trac (§3.4), then (d) uses BGP to
shi trac (§3.5). e operator will then repeat this cycle to
rene their response.
Our focus is on service operators that operate without
using a third party scrubbing service, and that have a xed
amount of pre-deployed capacity. For operators who employ
third-party scrubbing services, then the scrubbing service
is the lter in step (a). Typically the scrubbing service takes
over announcing the prex under aack, thus the operators
would use our approach. However, the scrubbing service
must then handle the aack, and they may employ steps (b)
through (d) to handle the aack on their sites.
We assume a network service operator monitors their
service and is quickly alerted when a DDoS aack begins.
e alert can be generated when a resource is nearly ex-
hausted at a particular site. A site may consider several
resources—ingress or egress network bandwidth, CPU or
memory usage— since each of these resources may become
a boleneck under dierent aacks [50].
We expect the operators to continue to monitor the ser-
vice during the aack and rene their response. Continuous
motioning is necessary to guard against aacks that change
over time (polymorphic aacks). It is also important because
other parties may respond to the aack as well, for exam-
ple, an upstream ISP may shi routing because of link over-
subscription, resulting in changes to anycast catchments.
Finally, monitoring allows the defender to rene their de-
fense and recover from imperfect estimates of site trac or
capacity.
3.2 Mapping Anycast
During the aack we plan to manipulate routing to respond
to trac. But making informed choices about routing changes
requires that we have some idea of what eect a change will
have. We therefore map our anycast catchments and how
they change in response to routing changes ahead of any
aack.
When mapping catchments, we determine which net-
works are associated with which anycast sites. We use Verf-
ploeter [18] to nd the catchments of the anycast clients
using active probing. Verfploeter uses a target hitlist of IPs,
and probe them with ICMP ECHO request. ICMP REPLY
from each target network ends up in its catchment site mak-
ing the network to anycast site mapping. An alternative is to
remember which customers are seen at each site over time
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or to observe from distributed vantage points such as RIPE
Atlas [3, 60].
Mapping should consider not only the current catchments
but also potential shis we might make during the aack.
is full mapping is easy to do with Verfploeter, which can
be continuously running in an adjacent BGP prex to map
the possible shis. is mapping process is important to
anticipate how trac may be shied. We will show later
that BGP control is limited by the granularity of routing
policy (§6) and by the deployment of the anycast sites (§7).
e actual aack trac may distort anycast—if the aack-
ers are concentrated in a few networks, routing changes may
not spread them out. Even then, mapping helps anticipate
how legitimate trac will shi.
A challenge in pre-computed maps with routing alterna-
tives is that routing is inuenced by all ASes. us, the maps
may shi over time due to changes in the routing policies
of other ASes. Fortunately, prior work shows that anycast
catchments are relatively slow to change [64].
3.3 Estimating a Site’s Oered Trac
Estimating the oered load to each site is an important rst
step in DDoS defense to allow us to select our defense strat-
egy (spread trac or absorb, as described next in §3.4). (By
“oered load”, we mean all the trac sent to the site, before
any loss due to DDoS-driven congestion. Ideally the site
would handle all this trac.)
Here we describe how we estimate site trac. We later
evaluate the accuracy of this approach (§5) and use it to
defend (§8).
Challenge and idea: Oered load is the combination of
legitimate trac and, during an aack, aack trac that is
sent to a site. e main consequence of a DDoS aack is
the exhausted resources, and during an aack, the server
and its access networks are overwhelmed. As a result, direct
measurements at the server detect only received trac. Dur-
ing an aack, received trac is constrained by the access
link and some oered trac will be lost one or more hops
upstream, before we can observe it. Our insight is that we
can directly infer loss from examination of end-to-end, known
good trac that is received, and from loss we can estimate
oered load to site.
Approach: We estimate site oered load by measuring
the fraction of known good trac that arrives at the service.
We next describe each of these sub-problems.
We want to observe loss of legitimate trac. Unfortu-
nately, there is no general way to determine the current rate
of legitimate trac—trac rates constantly change, some-
times unpredictably. Moreover, sophisticated aackers make
aack trac look just like good trac, making the trac
rate impossible to measure when it is most needed.
We therefore use subset of known good trac to represent
all legitimate trac. For DNS, RIPE Atlas provides a regular
source of known-good trac, sent from many places, with
out-of-band reporting. We assume that most commercial
services (in addition to DNS) have similar kinds of regular
monitoring trac.
We want oered load, or Toered . We know the observed
trac rate Tobserved—it is the access link bitrate, or it can
be measured at the access link. We know that α ·Toered =
Tobserved , where α is the accept fraction (the trac that is
not dropped).
To determine α , we observe that known good trac has
the same loss on incoming links as does other good trac
and aack trac. We know that RIPE Atlas sends mea-
surement trac at a known, constant rate Tknown, so α ·
Tknown,oered = Tknown,observed . Solving for α and substi-
tuting back gives us: Tˆoered =
Tobserved ·Tknown,oered
Tknown,observed
.
3.4 Defense Strategies
With knowledge of the oered load the defender can select a
defense strategy. A rst question is: is the aack larger than
the overall capacity or smaller?
For very large aacks, the defender’s goal is to preserve
successful service at some sites, while allowing other sites
to operate in degraded mode as absorbers [38]. e defender
may also choose to shi trac away from some degraded
sites to ease their pain. Unloading the overloaded sites is
recognized as breakwaters [31].
For moderate-size aacks, the defender should try to serve
all trac, shiing trac away from overloaded sites to less
busy sites. In heterogeneous anycast networks, where some
sites have more capacity than others, the defense approach
can be dierent. In these cases, larger, “super”-sites can
aract trac from smaller sites. For moderate-size aacks, it
may even be best for smaller sites to shut down if the super-
sites can handle the trac. We describe the BGP mechanisms
to shi trac in the next section.
3.5 BGP Tools to Shi Trac
BGP is the standard protocol used to exchange routing in-
formation between Autonomous Systems (ASes) on the In-
ternet [48]. While organizations with their own wide-area
networks can use SDN or other techniques for trac en-
gineering (TE) on their internal WAN [27, 52], BGP is the
only tool for TE between organizations. As a result, BGP has
mechanisms and conventions to manage routing policy. We
use two BGP mechanisms in the paper: AS-Path prepending
and BGP communities.
AS-Path Prepending is a way to decrease the preference
for a routing path. BGP’s AS Path is the list of ASes back to
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the route originator. e AS Paths’ primary purposes it to
prevent routing loops, and it also serves as a rough estimate
for distance, with BGP routes with shorter AS Paths. By
articially inserting extra ASes into the AS Path, the route
originator can dereference one site in favor of others. Path
prepending is known to be a coarse routing technique for
trac engineering. We measure how ne the control AS
path prepending provides to anycast in §6.1.
We deneNegative Prepending as the use of AS-Path prepend-
ing to draw trac towards a site. Prepending can only in-
crease path lengths, but an anycast operator in control of
all anycast sites can prepend at all sites except one, in eect
giving that site a shorter AS path (relative to the other sites)
than it had before. “Negative prepending by one at site S” is,
therefore, shorthand for prepending by one at all sites other
than S.
BGP Communities (or community strings) label specic
BGP routes with 32 or 64 bits of information. How this infor-
mation is interpreted is up to the ASes. While not ocially
standardized, a number of conventions exist where part of
the information identies an AS and the other part a policy
such as blackholing, prepend, or set local-preference. Com-
munity strings are widely supported to allow ISPs to delegate
some control over routing policy to their customers [1, 61].
4 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
e next sections evaluate our defense. ey use a common
methodology for evaluation: we deploy an anycast testbed,
modify routing to inuence trac, then map the catchments
through active probing with Verfploeter. is evaluation
method parallels how routing would be mapped in an op-
erational system (§3.2), but there it would use a test prex
running in parallel with the operational service.
4.1 Anycast Testbeds
We evaluate our ideas on two existing anycast testbeds,
since they support controlled experiments without hard to
real-world services. We use two independently developed
testbeds to show the generality of our results: Peering [53]and
Tangled [18]. Table 1 summarizes information about each
testing with its own set of geographically distributed sites,
and lists the of site’s location (Peering supports more sites
but we used 8 sites). Some sites are connected to one or
more transit providers, while others are connected to IXPs.
Peeringmainly has academic peers while Tangled has more
commercial providers.
Both sites support BGP-based trac engineering. Each
testbed support prepending, although in Peering, we are
limited to at most 3 prepends. Support for community strings
varies by site and testbed and its detailed in §6.1.
Testbed Used Sites Total
Peering
Amsterdam*†(AMS), Boston* (BOS),
Belo Horizonte*†(CNF), Seale* (SEA)
Athens* (ATH), Atlanta* (ATL),
Salt Lake City* (SLC), Wisconsin* (MSN)
8
Tangled
Miami (MIA)*, London (LHR)*,
Sydney (SYD)*, Paris (CDG)*,
Los Angeles (LAX)*, Enschede (ENS)*,
Washington (IAD)*, Porto Alegre (POA)*†
8
Table 1: Testbed and respective sites used in our exper-
iments. Transit providers (*) and IXP (†).
4.2 Measuring Routing Changes
To measure a BGP policy eect we rst change the route an-
nouncement at the site, give some time to propagate, conrm
that it is accepted, and nally start the anycast measurement.
Methods to make a routing change dier by testbed. Peering
provides an API so that testbed soware can validate changes.
Tangled allows us direct access to BGP at each site, so we
used exabgpcli [20] to apply the desired conguration on
sites.
Propagation time: Aer a change, we allow for BGP
route propagation. We know that routes can be inconsistent
(resulting in loops or blackholes) while routing is in ux [32,
57, 63]. Based on these prior studies we allow 15 minutes for
routing to “sele”.
Propagation of BGP policies: Policy constraints could
limit the acceptance of announced routes, but in practice
these limits do not aect our trac engineering. Best prac-
tices for networks at the edge lter AS-paths longer than
10 hops, and ASes in the middle oen accept up to 50, both
more prepends than we need. In addition, even though we
announce routes at IXPs, sometimes they are accepted at
only some peers. We conrm the propagation of our routes
using RIPE RIS [49]. It provides routing observations from
multiple global locations. Using RIPE RIS, we conrm that
congurations in our experiments are never blocked due to
route ltering.
5 EVALUATING ESTIMATION OF
OFFERED LOAD
We next evaluate our approach to estimate oered load. We
rst consider three real-world events, then build a mathe-
matical model predicting estimation accuracy and validate it
in controlled testbed experiments.
5.1 Case Studies
We rst demonstrate oered load estimation on real-world
DDoS events. We select a short-lived aack event in B-root
from 2019-09-07 where multiple B-root sites were aected
and had dierent levels of packet loss. We also examine two
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Attack Acc. Obs. Est. Rpt.
Date Dur. How Site Frac. . . . (Mq/s) . . .
2019-09-07 1m
UDP LAX 36% 1.0 2.7
vol. MIA 80% 1.1 1.4 2.7
ARI 12% 0.1 1.0 (tot.)
2016-06-25 3h SYN-. LAX 4% 0.1 2.5 10
2015-11-30 3h UDP LAX 2% 0.4 18.0 5.0
Table 2: Dierent attacks at B-root (with anonymized
site codes), comparing observed, estimated, and exter-
nally reported trac rates.
large DDoS events from 2015-11-30 and 2016-06-25 to look
at the worst-case aacks, when B-root exhibited signicant
upstream loss.
In Table 2 we show each aack and its type (UDP volu-
metric aacks are DNS ooding), with observed trac rates
and known-good loss rate. e last two columns show our
estimate and external reports. Each estimate uses §3.3, with
a 5-minute window from RIPE (about 1200 observations).
In 2019-09-07 event we estimate each site separately. Each
site showed a dierent loss rate, perhaps reecting aacker
location and site catchment size. Our estimation says S-1 saw
more than half of all trac which is roughly proportional to
the catchment size at that time. ere is no published ground
truth, but M-root provided us their observed trac rates,
binned to 5 minutes, from which we projected a 2.7 Mq/s size.
Because the event was shorter than M-root’s reporting pe-
riod and our estimation period, we suspect M-root binning
provides an underestimate. is uncertainty makes it di-
cult to make strong statements about whether our estimate
or M-root’s report is more accurate. However, our direct ob-
servations and estimate bracket M-root’s report, suggesting
the aack was larger than we could directly observe.
In the two large events in 2016 and 2015, B-root had only
one site and observed over 95% loss. For the 2016 event, we
see only 0.1 Mq/s and estimate 2.5 Mq/s, much lower than
the reported 10 Mq/s [42]. We believe this underestimate is
due in part to a network bug at B-root where, in addition to
aack trac, the ingress network was ow-control-limited
well below capacity. However, the estimate is much closer
than direct observation.
Finally, for 2015, loss was at 98% (2% access), resulting in
an overestimate of 18 Mq/s, three times reported values. At
such high loss rates, estimation is very sensitive to noise.
Although trac estimation is not perfect, in each case it
provides much beer information than direct observation.
For 2019, it suggests trac engineering would be warranted.
Figure 1: Topology with two upstream providers.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9
C1, C2 = 100Mb/s, C3 = 1Gb/s
L1 = 50Mb/s, A1 = 950Mb/s to 61Mb/s
L2 = 50Mb/s, A2 = 150Mb/s, α2=0.5
950 450 283 200 150 117 93 75 61
Bi
tra
te
(M
b/
s)
Access fraction in link 1, α1
Attack in link 1, A1(Mb/s)
estimated bitrate
offered bitrate
observed bitrate
Figure 2: Modeling site trac estimation.
5.2 Modeling Trac Estimation
We next consider a simple mathematical model of loss rate
to explore estimation accuracy when aacks are evenly dis-
tributed or concentrated on certain networks.
We consider a simple topology (Figure 1) where two access
links (Link-1 and Link-2 with capacity C1 and C2) enter the
service router (R3) to the server through Link-3 (at C3). For
simplicity, we assume C1 +C2 < C3, so the internal network
is never a boleneck. Links-1 and -2 have legitimate trac
Li . During an aack, aack trac Ai causes total trac
Ti = Li +Ai , resulting in loss on the links and a trac accept
fraction αi (αi = Ci/Ti ). We estimate oered load (Ti ) based
on loss of known-good trac as §3.3.
We have explored many scenarios to understand when
our estimator over- and under-estimates. In Figure 2, we con-
sider a simple scenario to explain the case studies (§5.1). In
this case, normal trac on both links is the same, and when
aacked, link 2 observes a xed 50% loss (α2 = 0.5), and we
vary aack strength on link 1 to see how the accuracy of
estimation changes. We see that when both links have the
same aack strength, our estimation is very accurate (the
two curved lines are the same at α1 = 0.5). Our estimation
is only slightly o when link 1 sees lile or no aack (as
α1 approaches 1). However, as oered load on link 1 grows,
more and more legitimate trac is lost and so our underesti-
mation grows (the estimated middle line does not track the
true top line).
Examination of other scenarios (omied for space) consid-
ered unequal access links and the potential for congestion
on link-3. We nd there are cases where we see slight over-
5
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
 0  50  100  150  200  250
Bi
tra
te
 (M
b/
s)
Duration (seconds)
observed bitrate
estimated bitrate
offered bitrate
(a) Almost accurate estimation with overall 52% ac-
cess fraction.
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
 0  50  100  150  200  250
Bi
tra
te
 (M
b/
s)
Duration (seconds)
observed bitrate
estimated bitrate
offered bitrate
(b) Under-estimation with overall 68% access frac-
tion.
Figure 3: DETERLab experiment to test the conditions
for accurate and under estimation.
or under-estimation, but large estimation error occurs only
as legitimate trac drops to zero.
5.3 Model Validation
We next validate our model with experiments in a testbed.
DETERLab is a congurable testbed that enable isolation in
a controlled network [6].
We follow our modeled topology in Figure 1. Here we
use unequal legitimate trac, with L1 of 80 Mb/s and L2
of 20 Mb/s, so changes to aack trac on L1 have greater
impact on our estimate. When loss is the same on both links
(50% loss with A1 = 120 Mb/s and A2 = 180 Mb/s), estimation
of site oered load should be accurate. Figure 3a shows this
case in the testbed; we slightly underestimate.
We repeated this experiment with a smaller aack in link
1 (A1 is 45 Mb/s, so loss is 20% and α1 = 0.80), so total
oered load is 325 Mb/s. Here our model predicts we will
underestimate, and the testbed experiments show 291 Mb/s.
Our model matches testbed experiments, providing con-
dence that we understand where it works best and where it
mis-estimates. It provides some understanding of our evalu-
ation of real-world cases.
6 FLEXIBILITY OF TRAFFIC
ENGINEERING IN ANYCAST
Given an estimate of oered load, the operators want to
shi trac with BGP mechanisms. We next look at the two
methods that are widely available: AS-path prepending and
using community strings to control routing announcements.
For each method we rst consider where it can be used (not
all methods are available at all sites). We then ask: how
much trac can it shi, and to what degree can this shi
be controlled? A method with ne-granularity control is
preferred over all-or-nothing.
Here we evaluate these questions across our two testbeds;
in §7 we evaluate how choice of testbed sites maers.
6.1 Control With Path Prepending
First we consider AS-path prepending.
6.1.1 Coverage. Support for AS-Path prepending is quite
complete—it requires no explicit support from the upstream
provider, so we found prepending worked at all sites in
both of our testbeds. In Peering, we are allowed to use
a maximum of three prepends, and in Tangled we use up to
ve prepends. Previous study [13] shows a maximum of 5
prepends is sucient because 90% of active ASes are located
less than six AS hops away. We use RIPE RIS [49] to check
the routing visibility when prepends are in place, and we
do not observe changes in the routing propagation for both
testbeds. Otherwise, this might reveal the existence of AS
path length lters [28, 29].
6.1.2 Does Prepending Work? Since AS-Path prepending
is widely supported, it seems like an aractive way to shi
trac. We next evaluate how much trac it can shi.
To explore this question we examine a particular anycast
conguration. We rst establish the trac baseline as how
many /24 network blocks are in each anycast site’s catchment.
Weighting catchments by prior trac loads gives result with
dierent constants but similar shape.
Here we consider a representative scenario using Peering
using three sites from three continents—Europe (Amsterdam-
AMS), North America (Boston-BOS) and South America
(Brazil-CNF). In §7 we explore how dierent congurations
change these results.
Figure 4 shows the trac from each site under dierent
conditions. e middle bar in each graph is the baseline,
the default condition with no prepending. We then add
prepending at each site, with one, two or three prepends
in each bar going to the right of center. We also consider
negative prepending ( §3.5) in one to three steps, with bars
going le of center.
We rst consider the baseline (the middle bar) of all three
graphs in Figure 4. Amsterdam (AMS, the boom, maroon
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Figure 4: Peering: Impact of path prepending in catchment distribution with AMS, BOS and CNF sites on 2020-02-
24.
part of each bar) gets about 68% of the trac. AMS receives
more trac than BOS and CNF because that site has two
transit providers and several peers, and Amsterdam is very
well connected with the rest of the world.
We next consider prepending at each site (the bars to
the right of center). In each case, prepending succeeds at
pushing trac away from the site, as expected. For AMS,
each prepend shis more trac away, with the rst prepend
cuing trac from 68% to 37%, then to 29%, then to about
16%. BOS and CNF start with less trac and prepending has
a stronger eect, with one prepend sending most trac away
(at BOS, from 15% to 7%) and additional prepends showing
lile further change. ese non-linear changes are because
changing BGP routing with prepending is based on path
length, and the Internet’s AS-graph is relatively at [2, 14].
e bar graphs also show that when prepending pushed
trac away from a site, it all goes to some other site. Where
it goes depends on routing and is not necessarily propor-
tional to the split in other congurations. For example, aer
one prepend to AMS, more trac goes to CNF (the top sky
blue bar) than to BOS (the middle yellowish bar). ese unex-
pected shis are why we suggest pre-computing a “playbook”
of routing options before an aack (§3.2) to guide decisions
during an aack and anticipate the consequences of a change.
We also see that negative prepending succeeds at drawing
trac towards the site—in each case the bars to the le of
center see more trac in the site that is not prepending while
the others prepend. AMS sees relatively lile change (68%
to 89%) since it already has most trac, while BOS and CNF
each gain up to 68% of trac.
All three sites show some networks that are “stuck” on that
site, regardless of prepending. One reason for this stickiness
is when some networks are only routable through one site
because they are downstream of that exchange. We conrm
this by taking traceroute to two randomly chosen blocks that
are stuck at BOS, 18.18.11.0/24 and 24.63.240.0/24. Tracer-
outes and geolocation (with Maxmind) conrm they are in
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Figure 5: Tangled: catchment distribution in respec-
tive BGP prepend policy.
Boston, at MIT and a Comcast network (based on the penul-
timate traceroute hop). We have used the local-preference
BGP aribute to move stuck blocks, but a systematic explo-
ration of that option is future work.
In summary, the experiment shows that AS prepend does
work and can shi trac among sites, however, this trac
shi is not uniform.
6.1.3 What granularity does prepending provide? Having
established that prepending can shi trac, we next ask:
how much control does it provide? is question has two
facets: how much trac can we push away from a site or
aract to it, and how many dierent levels are there between
minimum and maximum.
Limits: Figure 4 suggested that in Peering, with those
three sites, there is a limit to the trac that can shi. AMS,
BOS, and CNF always get about 16%, 7% and 3% of blocks,
regardless of prepending.
Figure 5 conrms this result with a 5-site deployment (two
from Europe, one from North America, one from South Amer-
ica and one from Australia) in our other testbed (Tangled).
X axis is presented with the number of prepends applied to
each site. e number zero (0) represents the baseline, the
positive numbers (1-5) are the number of prepending applied
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Site Transits IXP peers Options
AMS 2 122 20
BOS 1 0 1
CNF 1 5 1
ATH 1 0 1
SEA 1 0 1
SLC 1 0 1
ATL 1 0 1
MSN 1 0 1
Table 3: Selected sites from Peering along with the
number of transits, IXP peers, and propagating ASes
considering IPv4 BGP sessions on 2020-02-19.
and the negative numbers represent negative prepends. As
depicted, each site can capture at most 55–65% of blocks, and
can shed at most 95% of blocks, even with up to 5 prepends.
We can also see that we do not get a granular control as only
three points are between the minimum and maximum.
We conclude that while prepending can be a useful tool
to shi trac, it provides relatively limited control.
6.2 Control With BGP Communities
While AS-Path Prepending works everywhere, it provides
limited control. We next show that BGP community strings
have the opposite trade-o: what options they support vary
from site to site, but when available, they usually provide
more precise control over trac.
6.2.1 Coverage. ASes must opt-in to community strings,
as opposed to prepending’s near-universal support (since AS
paths are used for loop detection, prepending works unless it
is explicitly ltered out), Explicit support is required because
communities are only a tagging mechanism; the actions
they trigger are at the discretion of peering AS. Prior work
has studied the diverse options supported by community
strings [25].
To evaluate coverage, we review support for BGP com-
munities in the testbeds we use. e testbeds provide in-
formation about two dozen locations, a diverse, although
potentially biased, sample.
Peering supports selective announcement to the transit
providers and IXP peers that a site connects to, although each
site provides dierent numbers of IXP peers and transits (see
Table 3). Many sites have only one a transit and so provide
no options. We experimented with all options at AMS, since
with more than 100 peers over the IXP fabric it should provide
exibility. Unfortunately only a fraction of these respond to
our announcements, 104 IXP peers seem to fail to propagate
our routing announcement based on measurements from
Verfploeter. Similarly, we found no IXP peers propagate our
announcement when we use CNF. e options column of
Table 3 summarizes these results, showing how many routing
options we have using community strings and transits.
Tangled has dierent support over the sites. MIA supports
communities for selective announcement and selective path
pepending. ey document support to well-known commu-
nities, but they do not suport those described in RFC8642 [7].
Four other sites (LHR, SYD, CDG, and PDA) provide all three
communities (for selective announcement, well-known, and
prepending). LAX and IAD do not support communities. e
POA site is at an IXP with 208 IXP peers; it should provide
very ne-grained control. (We plan to examine POA control
to see its eects in practice.)
We conclude that, even at IXPs, selective announcement
oen requires direct negotiation with each peer, further lim-
iting coverage.
6.2.2 Do Community Strings Work and At What Granular-
ity? We next examine how well community strings work and
what granularity of control they provide. We use community
strings to specic BGP selective announcements, where we
propagate our route only to specic transit providers or IXP
peers.
For our experiment, we use Peering, varying announce-
ments at AMS and observing trac when anycast is provided
from AMS, BOS and CNF (the same topology as §6.1.2). As de-
scribed in §6.2.1 selective announcement community strings
are provided only at AMS, and they aect only two transits
and eighteen IXP peers, so community strings only work in
this subset of the network.
To select the target ASes for selective announcement, we
sort all the working peers of AMS site, based on the size
of their customer cone using CAIDA’s AS rank list [9]. We
then choose the 6 largest IXP peers and the 12 largest, as the
le two bars in Figure 6. We then examine the route server,
announced separately (the next bar), and then all IXP peers
including route servers. Finally, we see the coverage with
each of the two transit providers, announced separately.
First, we see that selective announcement provides greater
control than just prepending. AMS’ catchment goes from 68%
of blocks (the baseline), while other congurations provide
53 to 6% of blocks.
Second, we see that there is some overlap in some com-
binations. For example, the transits each reach more than
half of all blocks reachable from AMS, so we know some
blocks are reachable form both transit providers. us, while
there is some control over how many blocks to route to AMS,
some peers are very “strong” and will pick up many blocks
if they are allow to announce our prex.
ird, we see the important role of route servers. While
direct coordination with 12 IXP peers brings only 7% blocks
at AMS, a route server lets AMS reach more ASes and 14%
of the blocks alone.
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Figure 6: Peering: Impact of community string in
catchment distribution with AMS, BOS and CNF sites
(announced only from AMS site) on 2020-02-25.
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Figure 7: Tangled: using dierent communities to
shi trac on site LHR on 2020-04-05.
Finally, we see that transit providers play in important
role. AMS site has two transit providers—BIT BV (AS-12859)
and Netwerkvereniging Coloclue (AS-8283). Announcing to
AS-8283 aracts more trac to AMS than announcing to AS-
12859. Dierent AS relationship of these two transits with
their upstream provides us a dierent trac distribution.
When compared to AS path prepending, BGP communities
provide way more options. As shown in our experiments,
the dierent options indeed can provide beer control over
the trac distribution.
To investigate if the results found on Peering can be gen-
eralized, we made a set of experiments on Tangled. Like
Peering, we select 3 sites from three continents—London(LHR),
Miami (MIA) and Porto Alegre (POA), and use communities
for selective prepending and selective announcement. In
Figure 7, we show the catchment distribution aer using
the community strings from LHR. In the baseline, when no
communities are used, LHR handles 69% of trac. From
right to le, we see a gradual decrease in the catchment dis-
tribution from 69% to 33%. Stop announcing to IXP peers
reduces trac from 69% to 64%. But using prepending and
no export communities in AS2914 (NTT America), AS1299
(Telia Company) and AS3356 (Level 3), we can get 30-60% of
the catchments in LHR.
Both testbeds show that community strings are not widely
available in all sites, and that even well-known communities
are not fully adopted. When, community strings can provide
ner-grained control. Selective announcement mostly pro-
vides more “exibility” depending on how many IXP peers
and transits are connected. We also nd that some sites
do not provide the support that they claim which means
community strings require an extra step like contacting the
transit provider for an explicit agreement.
6.3 Playbook Flexibility
Based on our understanding of prepending and communities,
we can now build a playbook of possible trac congura-
tions for an anycast network.
Table 4 shows a sample playbook with selected congura-
tions. Operators will be aware of the baseline, and when the
site is under aack, if they wish to shi a site to a dierent
balance they can read it o from the table. Of course, if at-
tackers are concentrated on certain locations, trac may not
shi exactly as predicted, but this table is a starting point.
Finally, this table also suggests where trac ends up aer a
reconguration. e consequences of operator’s actions on
other sites are as important as reducing the load on one site.
Finally, the table helps us to quantify the “exibility” that
trac engineering allows us in this anycast deployment. If
we divide the trac mix into 10% bins, we see that AMS has
9 options, while CNF has 7, and BOS has only 5. Because
AMS and CNF mostly exchange trac within them aer a
BGP change, and because BOS is less well connected, no con-
guration with three sites allows BOS to take trac within
40-60% range.
Playbook stability:
A exible playbook is of limited use if routing immediately
changes. We know routing changes when links fail, or when
ISPs begin new peering or purchase new transit. How long
will a playbook be stable?
To answer this question, we observe the catchment of the
baseline case with the sites of Table 4. Table 5 shows the
percent of /24 blocks that go to each site over time. We see
that the fraction of blocks is generally quite stable, with only
about 5% of blocks shiing in or out of a site. In addition,
prior work has shown very strong anycast stability over
hours to days [64]. While catchments are relatively stable,
we encourage operators to refresh playbooks periodically
(perhaps weekly or monthly).
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Bins(%) / Site AMS BOS CNF
0-10 6-peers, 12-peers {1, 2, 3}×BOS, 1×CNF,{-1, -2, -3}×AMS, {-1, -2}×CNF
{1, 2, 3}×CNF, {-1, -2, -3}×AMS,
{-1, -2, -3}×BOS
10-20 Route-server, All-IXP-peers,3×AMS
Baseline, {2, 3}×CNF,
Transit-2, -3×CNF Baseline
20-30 -3×CNF, 2×AMS, -3×BOS Transit-1, 1×AMS, Transit-2, {1, 2, 3}×BOS
30-40 1×AMS, -2×BOS, -2×CNF
-1×BOS, 3×AMS, 6-peers,
12-peers, Route-server,
All-IXP-peers, 2×AMS
1×AMS, Transit-1
40-50 -1 ×CNF, -1×BOS, Transit-1 – 3×AMS, -1×CNF,All-IXP-peers, 2×AMS
50-60 Transit-2 – -2×CNF, 6-peers,12-peers, Route-server
60-70 Baseline, {1, 2}×BOS {-2,-3}×BOS -3×CNF
70-80 3×BOS – –
80-90 {1, 2, 3}×CNF, {-1, -2, -3}×AMS – –
90-100 – – –
Number of options 9 5 7
Table 4: A playbook for Peering with AMS, BOS, and CNF.
Months AMS(%) BOS(%) CNF(%)
2020-02 68.1 14.6 17.3
2020-04 70.4 14.2 15.4
2020-06 65.3 14.1 20.6
Table 5: Percent blocks in each catchment over time.
7 CONSTRAINTS OF ANYCAST
DEPLOYMENT
While §6 showed that BGP can shi trac, it steers trac
between the sites of a given deployment. Very large anycast
operators may have multiple anycast deployments on subsets
of their points-of-presence, and so are able to activate new
capacity. Here we instead assume a smaller operator where
all possible sites are active in the same anycast topology of
an aack. We examine how site choice and number of sites
alter the options for trac engineering during an aack.
7.1 Eects of Choice of Anycast Sites
First, we consider how site location aects our BGP play-
book. Site location and peering at that location inuences
its catchment, so use of an Australian or Europen might may
result in dierent catchments than a sites in North America.
In §6.1, we studied catchments with three specic Peering
sites on three continents: AMS, at a large, commercial IXP
in Europe; CNF with an academic backbone transit in Brazil;
and BOS, an academic site in the U.S. We now switch to three
educational sites all in the United States: SEA, at University
of Washington on the west coast; SLC, at the University of
Utah in the Rockies; and BOS, at Northeastern University in
Boston on the east coast.
More important than just geographical location, site con-
nectivity is the most important factor in choosing sites. Mul-
tiple transit providers increase the chance of having more
BGP options to eect trac control and granularity. While
a poorly connected site inside a university network tends to
provide less trac control options.
Prepending baseline: Figure 8 shows catchment sizes
for the three sites with positive and negative prepending.
For this network the baseline distribution is unbalanced,
but less so than before, with SEA capturing 50% of blocks.
We contacted Peering people to know why SEA gets an
unbalanced trac. ey suspect University of Washing-
ton/Northwestern GigaPoP is connected to the Seale IXP,
which may lead to its routes propagating faster (being shorter)
than the others. Which catchment has the greatest visibility
depends on the peers each site’s organization has.
Prepending coverage and granularity: As with our
prior experiments, we can adjust prepending to see how
trac shis. With these three sites, trac shis very quickly
for BOS and SEA aer one positive or negative prepend.
SLC has more exibility, perhaps because it has the smallest
catchment at the baseline, and gains more coverage with each
step of negative prepending, to 42%, 63%, and 91% of blocks.
Oen (but not always), we see that academic sites exhibit less
granularity because either they have few peers, or their peers
are academic networks with similar connectivity. As a result,
minor changes in AS-path length place one site further from
the others. In addition, this less granular control shows the
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Figure 8: Peering: Impact of choosing BOS, SEA and SLC sites on 2020-02-28
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Figure 9: Peering: Impacts of changing the number of
anycast sites from 2020-04-07 to 2020-04-10.
importance of building a playbook that is specic to a given
deployment, or when the anycast topology changes.
Community coverage: While communities are common
at IXPs and transit providers, academic networks (NRENs)
have a more simple set of communities. However, some of
our sites are located behind university networks and do not
provide BGP communities.
None of these academic sites on Peering provide commu-
nity strings. is observation conrms our prior coverage
observation: community string support is not uniformly
available. We also looked at two other combinations of sites
in Peering and found similar results (details in Appendix A).
7.2 Eects of Number of Anycast Sites
Next, we vary the number of sites and see how that changes
trac control. We select 3, 5 and 7 sites from each testbeds.
We announce our prex from each of the sites to establish a
baseline, then select dierent trac engineering congura-
tions to shi trac. Figure 9 shows selected congurations,
grouped by number of sites.
Baseline: With more sites, overall capacity increases and
baseline trac at each site is reduced as trac spreads out.
For example, in Figure 9, baselines are marked with *, and
the largest site (AMS) shis from 70% of blocks with three
sites to 61% and 56% with 5 and 7 sites. Smaller sites shi
less (BOS goes from 14% to 6% and 6%, and CNS from 15%
to 8% and 6%). Greater capacity and distribution requires a
larger and distributed aacker to fully exhaust the overall
service.
is spread of trac happens when sites are physically
distributed and using dierent peers. At rst, we consider
3 sites in Europe and North and South America (AMS, BOS
and CNF). e AMS catchment shrinks 9% with new sites
in Europe and North America (ATH in Greece and SEA in
the west). Most of this shi is blocks that move from AMS
to SEA (208k blocks move, and 101k, about half are in the
U.S.). More North American sites (SLC and ATL) reduce AMS
by only 5% (68k blocks). Trac shis from the European
catchment diminish in part once all North American blocks
already stay on the continent.
In the same way, we performed experiments on Tangled
to investigate the eects of the number of anycast sites. We
could conrm the ndings on Tangled and more details are
presented on Appendix A. An interesting nding was the
site shadowing. At Tangled we have two sites (IAD and
LAX) that share the same transit provider. When both sites
are running only LAX received trac. is happens because
the transit provider of both sites selects one to deliver trac
based on its own policy.
Tracexibility: Although more sites make it harder to
overwhelm the whole service, if aackers are concentrated
in a particular catchment it is easier to exhaust a single site.
We need to explore the BGP options even when there are
more number of sites.
With more sites, the largest site usually shows the largest
changes, usually with a few possible catchment sizes. Com-
paring the baseline with one prepending in Figure 9 we
noticed AMS shis from 70% to 37% with three sites, from
61% to 29% with ve, and from 56% to 23% with seven, always
being cut in half.
Even with more number of sites, some blocks are oen
“stuck” at a particular site. With three negative prepends,
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AMS gets most of the trac, but it tops out at 90% with
three sites, and only 87% and 84% with ve and seven. We
conclude that each site has its own set of “stuck blocks” that
are captive to it and will not move with trac engineering.
With more sites, the ne control of BGP communities be-
comes more important because path-prepending becomes
less sensitive. For example, when we have 5 or 7 sites,
prepending three times from AMS sheds all its trac. How-
ever, selective announcement only to 6 peers can keep ∼5%
catchment at AMS (bars with 6-peers in Figure 9). Other
selective announcements can provide us even more control
which is not possible with path prepending.
New sites: Our examination of site location also suggests
what happens when new sites are brought online. Trac
shis to the new site, but exactly which trac and how
much is dicult to predict, and sometimes a site with similar
peers or locations as another. A playbook to anticipate these
changes is important if new sites are a possible response to
DDoS aack.
8 DEFENSES ATWORK
We now evaluate our system (§3.1), showing how oered load
estimation (§5) lets us select trac engineering choices from
our playbook (§6) to support defending against an aack.
We then evaluate defense given smart adversaries.
8.1 Defense for One Real-Life Scenario
For an example defense we reproduce a small but real-world
aack from B-root, evaluating it against a three-site anycast
network. We evaluate how we could manage the aack using
measured routing catchments.
We take normal and aack trac from a real event on 2017-
03-06 in B-root [45]. is event was a volumetric aack
where the aack queries have common formats like RAN-
DOM.qycl520.com\032 or RANDOM.cailing168.com\032\032,
and the server mostly replies with NXDomain against these
queries. In this event we do not believe source IP addresses
were spoofed. e event was small enough that B-root was
able to fully capture it across all active anycast sites at the
time. e event lasted about 5 hours, but we show only the
rst 1000 s.
We evaluate this event by simulating trac rates against
two three-site anycast networks, both using Peering: rst
our AMS, BOS, CNF conguration from §6, then BOS, SEA,
SLC from §7.1. We assign trac to each anycast site based on
measurements of catchments from our experiments. Rather
than run a DNS service, we examine trac levels of each site
and compare it to a target capacity. e overall event had
peak rates of 120k queries/s (55 Mb/s), and our target capacity
is 55k queries/s (25 Mb/s) at each site. (Typical services today
and dicult aacks will both be much larger; rather than
scaling the aack up, we select a relatively low capacity.)
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(a) Breakwaters: steering trac using positive prepending.
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(b) Breakwaters: steering trac using negative prepending.
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(c) Breakwaters: steering trac using community string.
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(d) Super-site: pushing trac towards the super-site using
negative prepending.
Figure 10: Redistributing attack trac using dierent
strategies.
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In our replay we treat the event as starting at 0 s and
make an anycast change at 400 s. e operator will notice
the aack from query rate (or bitrate) alerts set at AMS.
e operator will then carry out oered load estimation,
which will report that the aack will be over capacity at
AMS (shown as the maroon striped area). Consuliting the
pre-computed playbook (Table 4), the operator can then
select a response.
Figure 10 presents four experiments, rst showing three
dierent responses and then an alternate topology. In each
graph we show absolute number of queries to each site. As
we cannot know the catchment of every block using Verf-
ploeter, we also show the number of unmapped queries. For
the rst experiment, Figure 10a, the operator selects path
prepending at AMS. e playbook suggests this will reduce
AMS trac to about two thirds its prior rate (from 80% to
50% in the playbook), and most of the shied trac will go to
CNF. Aer the route change, we see all three sites are under
capacity, as shown by the elimination of the AMS striped
region.
e operator could take other responses. For example,
suppose there were concerns about potential overload at
CNF. e playbook suggests that negative prepending at
BOS will shi trac to BOS without increasing trac at
CNF. Figure 10b shows trac aer negative prepending once.
AMS is no longer over capacity, and CNF trac only changes
slightly as BOS picks up the load.
Figure 10c shows a third strategy where we use BGP com-
munities at AMS to shi trac away. In this case we retain
routes to the all IXP peers at AMS but drop both transits.
According to the playbook, this approach can balance the
trac among three sites. Any one of these three approaches
was eective to get a trac distribution where all the query
rates are below than the assumed capacity.
Finally, we consider a dierent set of sites (BOS, SEA,
SLC from §7.1) and we assume SEA and SLC have capacity
for 25k queries/s while BOS supports 75k queries/s. Fig-
ure 10d shows that at aack time, both smaller sites are
overwhelmed (as shown by the striped regions). We use
negative prepending at BOS to bring all sites under capacity,
with BOS shouldering most of the load.
8.2 Adversarial Trac
DDoS aacks are inherently adversarial, so we must assume
the aacker will become aware of our defenses and seek to
counter them. We consider some responses and counters
below.
Aackers oen spoof source IP addresses to prevent eas-
ily ltering. Although best practices suggest ltering [22],
and the quantity of IoT devices perhaps obviate the need,
spoong is still common. While spoofed source addresses
will result in incorrect predictions about where load will go,
our primary decision is based on the actual load that arrives
at a site and that load is unaected by spoong.
Aackers may try to concentrate aacks on one site, or
spread aacks evenly across all sites. In either case, the de-
fender can select their desired response (absorb and sacrice
a site or spread trac). In fact, load estimation helps the
defender’s choice.
Polymorphic aackers changes aack types or intensity
during an aack. Although we increase defense agility, an
agile aacker will be a more dicult adversary.
Finally, our current proposal assumes human-in-the-loop
decisions. If they were integrated into an automatic defense,
one may need to moderate the rate of routing changes to
avoid interactions with route-ap damping [44].
9 CONCLUSIONS
is paper provides the rst complete description of using
anycast to defend against DDoS aacks. Our approach starts
with pre-computing a playbook of responses, then when the
aack arrives, the operator estimates oered load, selects
a strategy, and uses BGP to shi trac to best defend. We
answer key questions like how available and exible this
approach is for dierent congurations across two testbeds.
We show that prepending is widely available but oers lim-
ited control, while BGP communities are the opposite We
evaluate defenses with modeling and against a real-world
event. While operators have always used their best judgment
when under re, our work provides guidance for responses.
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APPENDIX A BGP IN OTHER ANYCAST
SET-UP
In this section, we present the complementary results from
the experiments performed in both testbeds. Here we present
data used to generalize our ndings.
A.1 A Small Site in Europe
AMS in Peering is well-connected with two transits, and
several IXP peers. Next, instead of AMS, we take ATH in
Europe which is connected through a research network in
Greece. Our goal is to see whether the ndings from §6 are
still valid in this anycast setup. Like the previous setup, we
also take BOS and CNF.
Figure 11 shows the catchment distribution. In the base-
line case, as ATH is not connected like AMS, it gets only 20%
trac. CNF serves almost 50% trac in this anycast setup.
So, the trac distribution is still skewed in this setup. Even
if both AMS and ATH are in Europe, we see a dierent catch-
ment control which indicates the importance of connectivity
of the anycast sites.
Prepending works similarly in this setup. BOS and CNF
can cut most of their trac aer rst prepend. However,
ATH can only shi 7% trac aer rst prepend, and for
more prepends it does not show any eect. In all these sites,
we can also see that some blocks are always “stuck” to a
particular site. Using negative prepending, we can push
most of the trac to BOS and CNF. However, we can only
push 40% trac to ATH site.
A.2 Sites in Nearby Location
Next, we take three sites that are in nearby location and have
similar connectivity. We select sites from Boston (BOS), At-
lanta (ATL) and Wisconsin (MSN) in Peering. All these sites
are located within the eastern half of the U.S., and they are
connected through education network—BOS with Northeast-
ern University, ATL with Georgia Institute of Technology,
and MSN with University of Wisconsin - Madison.
When the sites are located in nearby geo-location, and
connected by similar network, path prepending can result
in an “all or none” outcome. When we prepend from ATL
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Figure 11: Peering: Impact of path prepending in catchment distribution with ATH, BOS and CNF sites on 2020-
05-30.
Site Transits IXP peers Options
MIA 1 0 1
LHR 1 0 1
SYD 1 0 1
CDG 1 0 1
LAX 1 0 1
IAD 1 0 1
POA 2 218 218
Table 6: Selected sites from Tangled along with the
number of transits, IXP peers, and propagating ASes
considering IPv4 BGP sessions on 2020-02-27.
or BOS, most trac goes away from these sites. Prepending
one time from ATL leaves no trac in ATL, and prepending
one time from BOS cuts trac from 42% to 14%. Even with
negative prepending, BOS can get over 90% trac, and ATL
can get nearly 90% trac. So, BOS and ATL can cut or gain
almost all the trac with positive and negative prepending.
MSN receives a small fraction of trac in the baseline,
and some blocks are always “stuck” at MSN. With two nega-
tive prepends, MSN receives only 27% catchment, however,
with the third negative prepend, MSN receives almost 80%
catchment. is slow and sudden increase in the catchment
suggests us why we need a BGP “playbook” for an anycast
setup.
A.3 Communities coverage on Tangled
Tangled supports selective announcement to the transit
providers and IXP peers that a site connects to. Depend-
ing on the number of connected transits and IXP peers, we
have dierent number of community options at each site.
In Table 6 we show all the sites of Tangled that we use.
Most of them just have one transit provider and no direct con-
nection to IXP, where POA is an exception. On this site we
have two distinct transit providers and a direct connection to
local IXP. While IXP says to provide selective communities,
we did not explore this in detail.
A.4 More Sites in Tangled
We next want to conrm that increasing the number of sites
in Tangled shows the similar results that we get in §7.2.
Like Peering, we take 3, 5 and 7 sites in Tangled testbed
(Figure 13). As the overall capacity increases with more
number of sites, in Tangled also we can see the baseline
trac is reduced in each site as the trac spreads out. LHR
gets 55, 31 and 25% trac when there are 3, 5 and 7 sites.
With more sites, as there are more capacity in other sites,
one site can cut almost all of its trac. For example, with
3 prepends, LHR can cut all of its trac when there 7 sites
which is not possible when there are 3 or 5 sites.
We can see a “shadowing” instance when we have a 7-site
testbed. Aer adding ENS and POA, we can see that all trac
from LAX site disappears (Figure 13). We believe Cogent
trac now shis from LAX to POA, and academic trac
shis from LAX to ENS. We explain this issue in §7.2 when
IAD shadows LAX.
Like Peering, adding more sites can create new options
where the shied trac goes. For example, with 3 sites, LHR
trac goes to MIA when we make prepending. But when we
have 7 sites, a signicant amount of LHR trac goes to POA—
POA trac increases from 26% to 40% when we prepend from
LHR. Hence, it is necessary to keep a “Playbook” to see the
trac distribution aer a BGP change.
APPENDIX B SIDE-EFFECTS OF
CATCHMENT
MANIPULATION
As BGP manipulation steers trac among anycast sites, it
might redirect clients to a distant site causing an increased
path length and Round Trip Time (RTT). Next, we want to
measure these side-eects in our playbook to understand
how they change client latency. For short DDoS-events,
latency may be secondary, but some DDoS events last for
days and so latency may be relevant.
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Figure 12: Peering: Impact of path prepending in catchment distribution with BOS, ATL and MSN sites on 2020-
05-29.
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Figure 13: Tangled: Impacts of changing the number
of anycast sites.
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Figure 14: Changes in number of router hops aer
BGP manipulation
B.1 Changes in Number of Router Hops
BGP manipulation changes the catchment of the clients.
Clients might need to go to a distant site. We investigate
how the router distance changes when we manipulate BGP.
To know the changes in the hop count, we measure the
Time To Live (TTL) value for each of the incoming packets
at each site. Dierent targets set dierent initial TTL values,
and each router decreases the TTL value by one when it
forwards a packet. From the dierence between the initial
and received TTL values at an anycast site, we can determine
the number of routing hops from the targets to the anycast
sites. As dierent targets set dierent initial TTL values,
we do not guess the initial values. We use the dierence
between the received TTL values before and aer a BGP
manipulation to get the change in the hop count. We admit
that a particular target sometimes sets dierent initial TTL
values at dierent site due to the possible presence of a NAT,
however, this does not aect our result as they are very small
in number.
Next, we observe how the hop count changes when we
manipulate BGP from dierent sites. We consider the maxi-
mum three prepended paths from AMS, BOS and CNF sites
to observe the maximum possible distorted scenario with
path prepending. We also consider an extreme condition
with community strings where we announce only to 6 peers
of AMS site. From Figure 14, we can see that over 40% pre-
xes travel the similar or even less hop distance (when the
dierence in hop-count is 0 or negative). It is also apparent
that prepending from a well-connected site like AMS can
cause around 50% prexes to choose a longer path, and 25%
prexes travel more than 5 router hops. When we prepend
from a relatively less visible site like BOS or CNF, around 10%
prexes nd a beer route in terms of hop-count, and around
80% prexes travel the same hop distance. In summary, a
signicant amount of prexes see the same hop distance
even aer three prepends or announce only to 6 peers, and
prepending from a well-connected site has the worst impact
over the router hop distance of the clients.
B.2 Changes in RTT
Next, we want to see how the RTT changes when we manip-
ulate BGP from dierent sites. We use Verfploeter [18], but
we extended it to measure the RTT.
Variation in RTT follows the similar paern like the varia-
tion in hop count. When we prepend from a well-connected
site like AMS, we see an increased RTT—over 60% prexes
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Figure 15: RTT variation aer BGP manipulation
get an increased RTT (dierence between the no manipu-
lation and AMS-3 lines in Figure 15). When we announce
only to 6 peers from AMS site, over 50% prexes see an
increased RTT. We nd the opposite with a relatively not
well-connected site—improved or mostly similar RTT when
we prepend from BOS or CNF.
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